Section 1: Moot Court: United States v. Jones by Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Supreme Court Preview Conferences, Events, and Lectures
2011
Section 1: Moot Court: United States v. Jones
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at The College of William & Mary School of Law
Copyright c 2011 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview
Repository Citation
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at The College of William & Mary School of Law, "Section 1: Moot Court: United States v. Jones"
(2011). Supreme Court Preview. Paper 5.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview/5
I. Moot Court: United States v. Jones 
In This Section: 
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Synopsis and Questions Presented p. 2 
"SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE WHETHER POLICE CAN ATTACH GPS DEVICE. p. 19 
TO A CAR WITHOUT A WARRANT" 
. David G. Savage 
"COURT ASKED TO BALANCE INFORMATION AGE ADVANCES WITH p.20 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS" 
Robert Barnes 
"ApPEALS COURT LIMITS USE OF GPS TO TRACK SUSPECTS" 
Spencer S. Hsu 
"SUPREME COURT AGREES TO REVIEW CASE ON GPS AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT" 
Orin Kerr 
"THE COURT AGREES TO HEAR A CASE ABOUT WARRANTLESS GPS 
TRACKING ON CARS" 
Walter Dellinger 







United States v. Jones 
10-1259 
Ruling Below: United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), rehearing en bane 
denied, United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), eert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 671 (U.S. 
2010), eert. granted, 10-12592011 WL 1456728 (U.S. June 27, 2011). 
In 2004, authorities began investigating Antoine Jones and his co-:defendant Lawrence Maynard 
for narcotics violations. As part of this investigation, a GPS tracldng device was placed on 
Jones's Jeep and used to track his movements 24 hours per day for a period of one month. On 
October 25th, Jones and several others were charged with several offenses including conspiracy 
to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. After a 2006 mistrial, Jones and Maynard were tried 
jointly in November of 2007 and found guilty. Jones and Maynard appealed jointly arguing the 
district court e11'ed on several counts. Added to the joint arguments, Jones independently argued 
the evidence obtained through GPStracking violated his Fourth Amendment rights and as such, 
the district court e11'ed in admitting that evidence. 
Questions Presented: (1) Whether the warrantless use of a tracking device on petitioner's 
vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violated the Fourth Amendment. (2) Whether 
the government violated respondent's Fourth Amendmentrights by installing the GPS tracking 
device on his vehicle without a valid wa11'ant and without his consent. 
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee 
v. 
Lawrence MAYNARD, Appellant. 
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit 
Decided August 6, 2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: 
The appellants, Antoine Jones and Lawrence 
Maynard, appeal their convictions after a 
joint trial for conspiracy to distribute and to 
possess with intent to distribute five 
kilograms or more of cocaine and 50 grams 
or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. Maynard also 
challenges the sentence imposed by the 
district comi. Because the appellants' 
convictions arise from the same underlying 
facts and they make several overlapping 
arguments, we consolidated their appeals. 
For the reasons that follow, we reverse 
Jones's and affirm Maynard's convictions. 
I. Background 
Jones owned and Maynard managed the 
"Levels" nightclub in the District of 
Columbia. In 2004 an FBI-Metropolitan 
Police Depatiment Safe Streets Task Force 
began investigating the two for narcotics 
violations. The investigation culminated in 
searches and arrests on October 24, 2005. 
We discuss that investigation and the drug 
distribution operation it uncovered in greater 
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detail where relevant to the appellants' 
arguments on appeal. 
On October 25 Jones and several alleged co-
conspirators were charged with, among 
other things, conspiracy to distribute and to 
possess with intent to distribute cocaine and 
cocaine base. Maynard, who was added as a 
defendant in superseding indictments filed 
in March and June 2006, pled guilty in June 
2006. 
In October 2006 Jones and a number of his 
co-defendants went to trial. The jury 
acquitted the co-defendants on all counts but 
one; it could not reach a verdict on the 
remaining count, which was eventually 
dismissed. The jury acquitted Jones on a 
number of counts but could not reach a 
verdict on the conspiracy charge, as to 
which the coUrt declared a mistrial. Soon 
thereafter the district. court allowed Maynard 
to withdraw his guilty plea. 
In March 2007 the Government filed another 
superseding indictment charging Jones, 
Maynard, and a few co-defendants with a 
single count of conspiracy to distribute and 
to possess with intent to distribute five or 
more kilograms of cocaine and 50 or more 
grams of cocaine base. A joint trial of Jones 
and Maynard began in November 2007 and 
ended in January 2008, when the jury found 
them both gUilty. 
II. Analysis: Joint Issues 
Jones and Maynard jointly argue the district 
court erred in (1) admitting evidence 
gleaned from wiretaps of their phones, (2) 
admitting evidence arising from a search 
incident to a traffic stop, (3) denying their 
motion to dismiss the indictment as invalid. 
because it was handed down by a grand jury 
that had expired, (4) declining to instruct the 
jury on their theory that the evidence at trial 
suggested multiple conspiracies, and (5) 
declining to grant immunity to . several 
defense witnesses who invoked the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and refused to testify. Jones 
also argues the court en-ed in admitting 
evidence acquired by the wan-antless use of 
a Global Positioning System (GPS) device 
to track his. movements continuously for a 
month. After concluding none of the joint 
issues wan-ants reversal, we turn to Jones's. 
individual argument. 
III. Analysis: Evidence Obtained from 
GPS Device 
Jones argues his conviction should be 
overturned because the police violated the 
Fourth Amendment prohibition of 
"unreasonable searches" by tracking his 
movements 24 hours a day for four weeks 
with a GPS device they had installed on his 
Jeep without a valid wan-ant. We, consider 
first whether that use of the device was a 
search and then, having concluded it was, 
consider whether it was reasonable and 
. whether any en-or was harmless. 
A; Was Use ofGPS a Search? 
For his part, Jones argues the use of the GPS 
device violated his "reasonable expectation 
of privacy," Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 360-61, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concun-ing), and was 
therefore a search subject to the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. Of course, the Government 
agrees the Katz test applies here, but it 
argues we need not consider whether Jones's 
expectation of privacy was reasonable 
because that question was answered in 
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 103 
S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55. (1983), in which 
the Supreme Court held the use of a beeper 
device to aid in tracking a suspect to his 
drug lab was not· a search. As explained 
below, we hold Knotts does not govern this 
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case and the police action was a search 
because it defeated Jones's reasonable 
expectation of privacy. We then turn to the 
Government's claim our holding necessarily 
implicates prolonged visual surveillance. 
1. Knotts is not controlling 
The Government argues this case falls 
squarely within the holding in Knotts that 
"[a] person traveling in an automobile oli 
public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of. privacy in his movements 
from one place to another." In that case the 
police had planted a beeper in a five-gallon 
container of chemicals before it was 
purchased by one of Knotts's co-
conspirators; monitoring the progress of the 
car carrying the beeper, the police followed 
. 'the container as it was driven from the 
"place of purchase, in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, to [Knotts's] secluded cabin near 
Shell Lake, Wisconsin," a trip of about 100 
miles. Because the co-conspirator, by 
driving on public roads, "voluntarily 
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look" 
his progress and route, he could not 
reasonably expect privacy in "the fact of his 
final destination." 
The Court explicitly distinguished between 
the limited information discovered by use of 
the beeper-movements during a discrete 
journey-and more 'comprehensive or 
sustained monitoring of the sort at issue in 
this case. Most important for the present 
case, the Court specifically reserved the 
question whether a warrant would be 
required in a case involving "twenty-four 
hour surveillance," stating 
if such dragnet-type law enforcement 
practices 'as respondent envisions 
should eventually occur, there will 
be time enough then to determine 
whether different constitutional 
principles may be applicable. 
Id at 283-84, 103 S.Ct. 1081. 
Although the Government, focusing upon 
the term "dragnet," suggests Knotts reserved 
the Fourth Amendment question that would 
be raised by mass surveillance, not the 
question raised by prolonged surveillance of 
a single individual, that is not what 
happened., In reserving the "dragnet" 
question, the Court was not only addressing 
but in part actually quoting the defendant's 
argument that, if a warrant is not required, 
then prolonged "twenty-four hour 
surveillance of any citizen of this country 
will be possible, without judicial knowledge 
or supervision." The Court avoided the 
question whether prolonged "twenty-four 
hour surveillance" was a search by limiting 
its holding to the facts of the case before it, 
as to which it stated "the reality hardly 
suggests abuse." 
In short, Knotts held only that "[a] person 
traveling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his movements from one place 
to another," not that such a person has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements whatsoever, world without end, 
as the Government would have it. The Fifth 
Circuit likewise has recognized the limited 
scope of the holding in Knotts, as has the 
New York Court of Appeals. 
Two circuits, relying upon Knotts, have held 
the use of a GPS tracking device to monitor 
an individual's movements in his vehicle 
over a prolonged period is not a search, 
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 
1212 (9th Cir.2010);· United States v. 
Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir.2007), but in 
neither case did the appellant argue that 
Knotts by its terms does not control whether 
prolonged surveillance is a search, as Jones 
argues here. Indeed, in Garcia the appellant 
explicitly conceded the point. Br. of 
Appellant at 22 (No. 06-2741) ("Garcia does 
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not contend that he has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the movements of 
his vehicle while equipped with the GPS 
tracking device as it made its way through 
public thoroughfares. Knotts. His challenge 
rests solely with whether the warrantless 
installation of the GPS device, in and of 
itself, violates the Fourth Amendment."). 
Thus prompted, the Seventh Circuit read 
Knotts as blessing all "tracking of a vehicle 
on public streets" and addressed only 
"whether installing the device in the vehicle 
converted the subsequent tracking into a 
search." The court viewed use of a GPS 
device as being more akin to hypothetical 
practices it assumed are not searches, such 
as tracking a car "by' means of cameras 
mounted on lampposts or satellite imaging," 
than it is to practices the Supreme Court has 
held are searches, such as attaching a 
listening device to a person's phone. For that 
reason it held installation of the GPS device 
was not a search. Similarly,· the Ninth 
Circuit perceived no distinction between 
short- and long-term surveillance; it noted 
the appellant had "acknowledged" Knotts 
controlled the case and addressed only 
whether Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 
121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), in 
which the Court held the use of a thermal 
imaging device to detect the temperature 
inside a home defeats the occupant's 
reasonable expectation of privacy, had 
"heavily modified the FOUlih Amendment 
analysis." Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 
1216. 
In a third related case the Eighth Circuit held 
the use of a GPS device to track a truck used 
by a drug trafficking operation was not a 
search. United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 
604 (2010). After holding the appellant had 
no standing to challenge the use of the GPS 
device, the cOUli went on to state in the· 
alternative: 
Even if Acosta had standing, we 
would find no error .... [W]hen 
police have reasonable suspicion that 
a particular vehicle is transporting 
drugs, a walTant is not required 
when, while the vehicle is parked in 
a public. place, they install a non-
invasive GPS tracking device on it 
for a reasonable period of time. 
Id at 609-10. 
In each of these three cases the court 
expressly reserved the issue it seems to have 
thought the Supreme COUli had reserved in 
Knotts, to wit, whether "wholesale" or 
"mass" electronic surveillance of many 
individuals requires a warrant. As. we have 
explained, in Knotts the Court actually 
reserved the issue of prolonged surveillance. 
That issue is squarely presented in this case. 
Here the police used the GPS device not to 
track Jones's "movements from one place to 
. another," but rather to track Jones's 
movements 24 hours a day for 28 days as he 
moved among scores of places, thereby 
discovering· the totality and pattern of his 
movements from place to place to place. 
2. Were Jones's locations exposed to the 
public? 
As the Supreme Court observed in Kyllo, the 
"Katz test-whether the individual has an 
expectation of privacy that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable-has 
often been criticized as circular, and hence 
subjective and unpredictable." 533 U.S. at 
34, 121 S.Ct. 2038. Indeed, the Court has 
invoked various and varying considerations 
in applying the test. This much is clear, 
however: Whether an expectation of privacy 
is reasonable depends in large part upon 
whether that expectation relates to 
information that has been "expose[ d] to the 
public." 
Two considerations persuade us the 
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information the police discovered in this 
case-the totality of Jones's movements 
over . the course of a month-' was not 
exposed to the public: First, unlike one's 
movements during a single journey, the 
whole of one's movements over the course 
of a month is not actually exposed to the 
public because the likelihood anyone will 
observe all those movements is effectively 
nil. Second, the whole of one's movements 
is not exposed constructively even though 
each individual movement is exposed, 
because that whole reveals more-
sometimes a great deal more-than does the 
sum of its parts. 
a. Actually exposed? 
The holding in Knotts flowed naturally from 
the reasoning in Katz: "What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a 
subject of FOUlih Amendment protection." 
The Government argues the same reasoning 
applies here as well. We first consider the 
precedent governing our analysis of whether 
the subject of a purported search has been 
exposed to the public, then hold the 
information the police discovered using the 
GPS device was not so exposed. 
(i) Precedent 
The Government argues Jones's movements 
. over the course of a month were actually 
exposed to the public. because the police 
lawfully could have followed Jone.s 
everywhere he went on public roads over the 
course· of a month. The Government 
implicitly poses the wrong question, 
however. 
In considering whether something is 
"exposed" to the public as that term was 
used in Katz we ask not what another person 
can physically and may lawfully do b.ut 
rather what a reasonable person expects 
another might actually do. Indeed, in Riley, 
Justice O'Connor, whose concurrence was 
necessary to the judgment, pointed out: 
Ciraolo's expectation of privacy was 
umeasonable not because the 
airplane was operating where it had a 
"right to be," but because public air 
travel at 1,000 feet is a sufficiently 
routine part of modem life that it is 
unreasonable for persons on the 
ground to expect that their curtilage 
will not be observed from the air at 
that altitude. 
If the public rarely, if ever, travels 
overhead at such altitudes, the 
observation cannot be said to be 
from a vantage point generally used 
by the public and Riley cannot be 
said to have "knowingly expose[ d]" 
his greenhouse to public view. . 
488 U.S. at 453, 455, 109 S.Ct. 693; see also 
id. at 467, 109 S.Ct. 693 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (explaining five justices agreed 
"the reasonableness of Riley's expectation 
depends, in large measure, on the frequency 
of nonpolice helicopter flights at an altitude 
of 400 feet"). 
The Supreme Court re-affirmed this 
approach in Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 
334, 120 S.Ct. 1462, 146 L.Ed.2d 365 
(2000). There a passenger on a bus traveling 
to Arkansas from California had placed his 
soft luggage in the overhead storage area 
above his seat. During a routine stop at an 
off-border immigration checkpoint in Sierra 
Blanca, Texas, a Border Patrol agent 
squeezed the luggage in order to determine 
whether it contained drugs and thus detected 
a brick of what turned out to' be 
methamphetamine. The defendant argued 
the agent had defeated his reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and the Government 
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argued his expectation his bag would not be 
squeezed was unreasonable because he had 
exposed it to the public. The Court 
responded: 
[A] bus passenger clearly expects 
that his bag may be handled. He does 
not expect that other passengers or 
bus employees will, as a matter of 
course, feel the bag in an exploratory 
manner. But this is exactly what the 
agent did here. We therefore hold 
that the agent's physical 
manipulation of petitioner's bag 
violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Id at 338-39, 120 S.Ct. 1462. 
The Court focused not upon what other 
passengers could have done or what a bus 
company employee might have done, but 
rather upon what a reasonable bus passenger 
expects others he may encounter, i.e., fellow 
passengers or bus company employees, 
might actually do .. A similar focus can be 
seen in Kyllo, in which the Court held use of 
a thermal imaging device defeats the 
subject's reasonable expectation of privacy, 
"at least where . . . the· technology in 
question is not in general public use." 
The Government cites as authority to the 
contrary our statement in United States v. 
Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 759 (2000), that 
"[t]h6 decisive issue ... is not what the 
officers saw but what they could have seen." 
When read in context, however, this snippet 
too supports the view that whether 
something is "expose[ d] to the public," 
depends not upon the theoretical possibility, 
but upon the actual likelihood, of discovery 
by a stranger: 
The decisive issue ... is not what the 
officers saw but what they could 
have seen. At any time, the 
surveillance vehicle could have 
pulled alongside of the taxi and the 
officers could have watched 
Gbemisola through its window. 
Indeed, the taxi driver himself could 
. have seen the event. simply by 
looking in his rear-view mirror or 
turning around. As one cannot have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy 
concerning an act performed within 
the visual range of a complete 
stranger, the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement was not 
implicated. 
225 F.3d at 759. 
In short, it was not at all unlikely Gbemisola 
would be observed opening a package while 
seated in the rear of a taxi, in plain view of 
the driver and perhaps of others. 
(ii) Application 
Applying the foregoing analysis to the 
present facts, we hold the whole of a· 
person's movements over the course of a 
month is not actually exposed to the public 
because the likelihood a stranger would 
observe all those movements is not just 
remote, it is essentially nil. It is one thing for 
a passerby to observe or even to. follow 
someone during a single journey as he goes 
to the market or returns home from work It 
is another thing entirely for that stranger to 
pick up the scent again the next day and the 
day after that, week in and week out, 
dogging his prey until he has identified all 
the places, people, amusements, and chores 
that make up that person's hitherto private 
routine. 
b. Constructively exposed? 
The Government does not separately raise, 
but we would be remiss if we did not 
address, the possibility that although the 
whole of Jones's movements during the 
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month for which the police monitored him 
was not actually exposed to the public, it 
was constructively exposed because each of 
his individual movements during that time 
was itself in public view. When it comes to 
privacy, however, precedent suggests that 
the whole may be more revealing than the 
parts. Applying that precedent to the 
circumstances of this case, we hold the 
information the police discovered using the 
GPS device was not constructively exposed. 
(i) Precedent 
The Supreme Court addressed the 
distinction between a whole and the sum of 
its parts in United States Department of 
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom 
of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 103 
LEd.2d 774 (1989), which arose not under 
the Fourth Amendment but under the 
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 
552. There the respondents had requested, 
pursuant to the FOIA, that the FBI disclose 
rap sheets compiling the criminal records of 
certain named persons. Although the 
"individual events in those summaries 
[were] matters of public record," the Court 
upheld the FBI's invocation of the privacy 
exception to the FOIA, holding the subjects' 
had a privacy interest in the aggregated 
'-'whole" distinct from their interest in the 
"bits of information" of which it was 
composed. Most relevant to the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court said disclosure of a 
person's rap sheet "could reasonably be 
expected to constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy." 
The Court implicitly recognized the 
distinction between the whole and the sum 
of the parts in the Fourth Amendment case 
of Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 
S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). There, in 
holding the use of a pen register to record all . 
the numbers dialed from a person's phone 
was not a search, the Court considered not 
just whether a reasonable person expects any 
given number he dials to be exposed to the 
phone company but also whether he expects 
all the numbers he dials to be compiled in a 
list. The Court explained that Smith could 
not reasonably expect privacy in the list of 
numbers because that list was composed of 
information that he had "voluntarily 
conveyed to [the company]" and that "it had 
facilities for recording and . . . was free to 
record." 
If, for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment, the privacy interest in a whole 
could be no greater (or no different) than the 
privacy interest in its constituent parts, then. 
the Supreme Court would have had no 
reason to consider at length whether Smith 
could have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the list of numbers he had called. 
Indeed, Justice Stewart dissented 
specifically because he thought the 
difference was significant on the facts of 
that case. See id. at 747, 99 S.Ct. 2577 
("such a list [of all the telephone numbers 
one called] easily could reveal ... the most 
intimate details of a person's life"). 
(ii) Application 
The whole of one's movements over the 
course of a month is not constructively 
exposed to the public because, like a rap 
sheet, that whole reveals far more than the 
individual movements it comprises. The 
difference is not one of degree but of kind, 
for no single journey reveals the habits and 
patterns that mark the distinction between a 
day in the life and a way of life, nor the 
departure from a routine that, like the dog 
that did not bark in the Sherlock Holmes 
story, may reveal even more. 
As with the "mosaic theory" often invoked 
by the Government in cases involving 
national security information,· "What may 
seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear 
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of great moment to one who has a broad 
view of the scene." Prolonged surveillance 
reveals types of information not revealed by 
short-term surveillance, such as what a 
person does repeatedly, what he does not do, 
and what he does ensemble. These types of 
information can each reveal more about a 
person than does any individual trip viewed 
in isolation. Repeated visits to a church, a 
gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told 
by any single visit, as does one's not visiting 
any of these places over the course of a 
month. The sequence of a person's 
movements can reveal still more; a single 
trip to a gynecologist's office tells little· 
about a woman, but that trip followed a few 
. weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store 
tells a different story. A person who knows 
all of another's travels can deduce whether 
he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, 
a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, 
an outpatient receiving medical treatment, 
. an associate of particular individuals or 
political groups-and not just one such fact 
about a person, but all such facts. 
Other courts have recognized prolonged 
surveillance of a person's movements may 
reveal an intimate picture of his life. Indeed, 
they have reached that conclusion in cases 
involving prolonged GPS monitoring. See 
People v. Weaver, 12 N.y'3d 433, 882 
N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 
(2009) (Prolonged GPS monitoring "yields . 
. . a highly· detailed profile, not simply of 
where we go, but by easy inference, of our 
associations-political, religious, amicable 
and amorous, to name only a few-and of 
the pattern of our professional and 
avocational pursuits"); State v. Jackson, 150 
Wash.2d 251, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (2003) (en 
banc) ("In this age, vehicles are used to take 
people to a vast number of places that can 
reveal preferences, alignments, associations, 
personal ails and foibles. The GPS tracking 
devices record all of these travels, and thus 
can provide a detailed picture of one's 
life."). 
A reasonable person does not expect anyone 
to monitor and retain a record of every time 
he drives his car, including his origin, route, 
destination, and each place he stops and how 
long he stays there; rather, he expects each 
of those movements to remain 
"disconnected and anonymous." In this way 
the extended recordation of a person's 
movements is, like the "manipulation of a 
bus passenger's carry-on" canvas bag in 
Bond, not what we expect anyone to do, and 
it reveals more than we expect anyone to 
know. 
3. Was Jones's expectation of privacy 
reasonable? 
It does not apodictically follow that, because 
the aggregation of Jones's movements over 
the course of a month was not exposed to 
the public, his expectation of privacy in 
those movements was reasonable' , 
"legitimation of expectations of privacy 
must have a source outside the Fourth 
Amendment," such as "understandings that 
are recognized or permitted by society," So 
it is that, because the "Congress has decided 
. . . to treat the interest in 'privately' 
possessing cocaine as illegitimate," 
"governmental conduct that can reveal 
whether a substance is cocaine, and no other 
arguably 'private' fact, compromises no 
legitimate privacy interest." 
The Government suggests Jones's 
expectation of privacy in his movements 
was unreasonable because those movements 
took place in his vehicle, on a public way, 
rather than inside his home. That the police 
tracked Jones's movements in his Jeep 
rather than in his home is celiainly relevant 
to the reasonableness of his expectation of 
privacy; "in the sanctity of the home," the 
COUli has observed, "all details are intimate 
details." A person does not leave his privacy 
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behind when he walks out his front door, 
however. On the contrary, in Katz the Court 
clearly stated "what [one] seeks to preserve 
as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected." 
Or, as this court has said, outside the home, 
the "Fourth Amendment . . . secur[ es] for 
each individual a private enclave, a 'zone' 
bounded by the individual's own reasonable 
expectations of privacy." 
Application of the test in Katz and its 
sequellae to the facts of this case can lead to 
only one conclusion: Society recognizes 
Jones's expectation of privacy in his 
movements over the course of a month as 
reasonable, and the use of the GPS device to 
monitor those movements defeated that 
reasonable expectation. As we have 
discussed, prolonged GPS monitoring 
reveals an intimate picture of the subject's 
life that he expects no one to have-short 
perhaps of his spouse. The intrusion such 
monitoring makes into the subject's private 
affairs stands. in stark contrast to the 
relatively brief intrusion at issue in Knotts; 
indeed it exceeds the intrusions occasioned 
by every police practice the Supreme Court 
has deemed a search under Katz, such as a 
. urine test, use of an electronic listening 
device to tap a payphone, inspection of a 
traveler's luggage, or use of a thelmal 
imaging device to discover the temperature 
inside a home. 
We note without surprise, therefore, that the 
Legislature of California, in maldng it 
unlawful for anyone but a law enforcement 
agency to "use an electronic tracking device 
to determine the location or movement of a 
person," specifically declared "electronic 
tracking of a person's location without that 
person's knowledge violates that person's 
reasonable expectation of privacy," and 
implicitly but necessarily thereby required a 
warrant for police use of a GPS. Several 
other states have enacted legislation 
imposing civil and criminal penalties for the . 
use of electronic tracking devices and 
expressly requiring exclusion of evidence 
produced by such a device unless obtained 
by the police acting pursuant to a warrant. 
Although perhaps not conclusive evidence 
of nationwide "societal understandings," 
these state laws are indicative that prolonged 
GPS monitoring defeats an expectation of 
privacy that our society recognizes as 
reasonable. So, too, are the considered 
judgments of every court to which the issue 
has been squarely presented. The federal 
circuits that have held use of a GPS device 
is not a search were not alert to' the 
distinction drawn in Knotts between short-
term and prolonged surveillance, but we 
have already explained our disagreement on 
that collateral point. 
4. Visual surveillance distinguished 
The Government would have us abjure this 
conclusion on the ground that "[Jones's] 
argument logically would prohibit even 
visual surveillance of persons or vehicles 
located in public places and exposed to 
public view, which clearly is not the law." 
We have already explained why Jones's 
argument does not "logically . . . prohibit" 
milch visual surveillance: Surveillance that 
reveals only what is already exposed to the 
public-such as a person's movements 
during a single journey-is not a search. 
Regarding visual surveillance so prolonged 
it reveals information not exposed to the 
public, we note preliminarily that the 
Government points to not a single actual 
example of visual surveillance that will be 
affected by our holding the use of the GPS 
in this case was a search. No doubt the 
reason is that practical considerations· 
prevent visual surveillance from lasting very 
long. Continuous human surveillance for a 
week would require all the time and expense 
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of several police officers, while comparable 
photographic surveillance would require a 
net of video cameras so dense and so 
widespread as to catch a person's every 
movement, plus the manpower to piece the 
photographs together. Of course, as this case 
and some of the GPS cases in other courts 
illustrate, prolonged GPS monitoring is not 
similarly constrained. On the contrary, the 
marginal cost of an additional day-or 
week, or month-of GPS monitoring is 
effectively zero. Nor, apparently, is the fixed 
cost of installing a GPS device significant; 
the Los Angeles Police Department can now 
affix a GPS device to a passing car simply 
by launching a GPS-enabled dart. For these 
practic~l reasons, and not by virtue of its 
sophistication or novelty, the advent of GPS 
technology has occasioned a heretofore 
unknown type of intrusion into an ordinarily 
and hitherto private enclave. 
. The Government's argument-that our 
holding the use of the GPS device was a 
search necessarily implicates prolonged 
visual surveillance-fails even on its own 
terms. That argument relies implicitly upon 
an assumption rejected explicitly in Kyllo, to 
wit, that the means used to uncover private 
information play no role in determining 
whether a police action frustrates a person's 
reasonable expectation of privacy; when it 
comes to the Fourth Amendment, means do 
matter. For example, the police may without 
a warrant record one's conversations by 
planting an undercover agent in one's midst, 
but may not do the same by wiretapping 
one's phone, even "without any trespass." 
Quite simply, in the former case one's 
reasonable expectation of control over one's 
personal information would not be defeated; 
in the latter it would be. 
This case does not require us to, and 
therefore we do not, decide whether a 
hypothetical instance of prolonged visual 
surveillance would be a search subject to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. As the Supreme Court said in 
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, "Fourth 
Amendment cases must be decided on the 
facts of each case, not by extravagant 
generalizations. 'We have never held that 
potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of 
privacy constitute searches for purposes of 
the FOUlih Amendment.'" 476 U.S. 227, 238 
n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) 
(quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 
705, 712, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 
(1984». By the same token, we refuse to 
hold this "search is not a search," merely 
because a contrary holding might at first 
blush seem to implicate a different but 
intuitively permissible practice. Instead, just 
as the Supreme Court in Knotts reserved the 
lawfulness of prolonged beeper surveillance, 
we reserve the lawfulness of prolonged 
visual surveillance . 
B. Was the Search Reasonable 
Nonetheless? 
A search conducted without a warrant is 
"per· se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment-subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions." Here, because the police 
installed the GPS device on Jones's vehicle 
without . a valid warrant, the Government 
argues the resulting search can be upheld as 
a reasonable application of the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement. Under .. 
that exception, "[i]f a car is readily mobile 
and probable cause exists to believe it 
contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment 
. . . permits police to search the vehicle 
without more." 
As Jones points out, this argument is doubly 
off the mark. First, the Government did not 
raise it below. Second, the automo bile 
exception permits the police to search a car 
without a warrant if they have reason to 
believe it contains contraband; the exception 
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does not authorize them to install a tracldng 
device on a car without the approval of a 
neutral magistrate. 
C. Was the Error Harmless? 
Finally, the Government argues in a terse 
and conclusory few lines that the district 
court's error in admitting evidence obtained 
by use of the GPS device was harmless. 
"The beneficiary of -a constitutional error 
[must prove] beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error complained of did not contribute to 
the verdict obtained." 
According to the Government, 
"Overwhelming evidence implicated [Jones] 
in the drug-distribution conspiracy." 
Overwhelming evidence certainly showed 
there was a conspiracy to distribute and to 
possess with intent to distrihute drugs based 
out of 9508 Potomac Drive, Ft. Washington, 
Maryland, where police found $850,000 in 
cash, 97 kilograms of cocaine, and one 
kilogram of cocaine base. The evidence 
linking Jones to that conspiracy, however, 
was not strong, let alone overwhelming. 
The Government points to no evidence of a 
drug transaction in which Jones was 
involved, nor any evidence that Jones ever 
possessed any drugs. Instead it relies upon 
(1) the testimony of admitted participants in 
the conspiracy, one of whom (Bermea) was 
at the Potomac Drive house when the police 
arrived-to the effect that Jones was the 
ringleader of the operation and frequented 
the Potomac Drive house, (2) data showing 
Jones used his cell-phone frequently and 
often called some of the conspirators, 
including one whose phone was found at the 
Potomac Drive house, (3) leases in Jones's 
name for other properties the Government 
alleged were used in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, (4) currency seized from Jones's 
Jeep and mini-van, and (5) physical and 
photographic surveillance showing Jones 
visited the Potomac Drive house a few 
times. Jones's defense responded to each 
type of evidence as follows: (1) the 
cooperating witnesses had cut deals with the 
Government and were not credible, (2) the 
cell-phone records and (5) visits to Potomac 
Drive showed only that Jones knew the 
participants in the conspiracy, (3) Jones 
leased the other properties for legitimate 
purposes and no drugs were found there, (4) 
and his nightclub was a cash business. 
The GPS data were essential to the 
Government's case. By combining them 
with Jones's cell-phone records the 
Government was able to paint a picture of 
Jones's movements that made credible the 
allegation that he was involved in drug 
trafficldng. In his closing statement the 
Government attorney summarized this way 
the inference he was asking the jury to draw: 
[W]hen there is a conversation with 
Bermea and [Jones] says, I'm 
coming to see you, or I'll be there in 
ten minutes, and within a while . . . 
the GPS shows that that vehicle is in 
Potomac Drive, how does that all fit 
together? Well it fits together exactly 
as you know. That the defendant is 
going to 9508 Potomac Drive, and 
there's no reason anyone goes there 
other than drug activity. 
* * * 
Then, that follows these series of 
conversations,' day after day, GPS 
reading after .GPS reading, with the 
defendant speaking with [Bermea] 
and then the vehicle coming to 
Potomac Drive .... You'll have the 
timeline. You've got the 
conversations. I won't go through 
them all." 
Tl·. 1/3/08 at 114-18. 
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As mentioned earlier, the Government had 
also stressed in its opening remarks, which 
would color the jury's understanding of the 
whole case, that the GPS data would 
demonstrate Jones's involvement in the 
conspiracy, 
To be sure, absent the GPS data a jury 
reasonably might have inferred Jones was 
involved in the conspiracy, "We 'are not 
concerned here," however, "with whether 
there was sufficient evidence on which 
[Jones] could have been convicted without 
the evidence complained of'; rather oUr 
concern is with "whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the evidence 
complained of might have contributed to the 
conviction," Without the GPS data the 
evidence that Jones was actually involved in 
the conspiracy is so far from 
"overwhelming" that we are constrained to 
hold the Government has not carried its 
burden of showing the error was 'harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
IV. Conclusion 
Maynard's conviction and sentence are 
affirmed because neither any of the 
appellants' joint arguments nor Maynard's 
individual argument warrants reversal.' 
Jones's conviction is reversed because it was 
obtained with evidence procured in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
So ordered, 
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UNITED STATES of America, Appellee 
v. 
Antoine JONES, Appellant. 
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit 
November 19, 2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted] 
GINSBURG, TATEL and GRIFFITH, 
Circuit Judges, concurring in the denial of 
rehearing en banc: 
In response to the Government's petition, 
we underline two matters. First, because the 
Government did not argue the points, the 
court did not decide whether, absent a 
warrant, either reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause would have been sufficient 
. to render the use of the GPS lawful; to the 
extent the Government invoked the 
automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement, as we pointed out, that 
exception applies only when "a car is readily . 
mobile and probable cause exists to believe 
it contains contraband,". neither of which 
elements the Government satisfied. Second, 
the Government's petition complains that 
the court's opinion "implicitly calls into 
question common and important practices 
such as sustained visual surveillance· and 
photographic surveillance of public places," 
but that is not correct. The court explicitly 
noted: "This case does not require us to, and 
therefore we do not, decide whether a 
hypothetical instance of prolonged visual 
surveillance would be a search subject to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. " 
SENTELLE, Chief Judge, joined by 
HENDERSON, BROWN, and 
KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, dissenting 
from the denial of tehearing en banc: 
The panel opinion in this case held that the 
government's warrantless use of a global 
positioning system ("GPS") device to track 
the public movements of appellant Antoine 
Jones's vehicle for approximately four 
weeks was an umeasonable search in 
violation of Jones's Fourth Amendment 
rights. In my view, this question should be 
reviewed by the court enbanc because the 
panel's decision is inconsistent not only with 
every other federal circuit· which has 
considered the case, but more importantly, 
with controlling Supreme Court precedent 
set forth in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 
276, 103 S.Ct. 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d 55 (1983). 
In Knotts, the Supreme Court reviewed a 
case in which law enforcement officers had 
placed a radio transmitter ("beeper") inside a 
chloroform container which was in turn 
placed inside a motor vehicle. Through the 
use of the electronic signals from the beeper, 
the police tracked the chloroform container 
from one automobile to another across the 
length of an interstate journey from 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, to Shell Lake, 
Wisconsin. The information obtained from 
the electronic monitoring was augmented by 
intern1ittent physical surveillance and by 
monitoring from.a helicopter. In upholding 
the constitutionality of the surveillance by 
electronic monitoring, the Supreme Court 
reviewed the establishment of the privacy 
interest as the principal right protected by 
the FOUlih Amendment's guarantee. To 
. bri~fly summarize the Court's jurisprudence 
from Knotts and its predecessors: if there is 
no invasion of a reasonable expectation of 
14 
privacy, there is no violation of the Fourth 
Amendment protection "against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." 
Applying that jurisprudence to the 
electronically enhanced surveillance in 
Knotts, the Court declared that "[a] person 
traveling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his movements from one place 
to another." The Court went on to note that 
"[w]hen [the suspect] traveled over the 
public streets, he voluntarily conveyed to 
anyone who wanted to look the fact that he 
was traveling over particular roads in a 
particular direction, the fact of whatever 
stops he made, and the fact of his final 
destination when he" exited from public 
roads onto private property." The Court 
. further reasoned that since visual 
surveillance from public places along the 
route or adjacent to the destination would 
have revealed all of the same information to 
the police, "[t]he fact that the officers ... 
relied not only on visual surveillance, but 
also on the use of the beeper to signal the 
presence of [the suspect's] automobile to the 
police receiver, does not alter the situation." 
Central to the Knotts COUli's reasoning, and, 
I think, controlling in this case· is the 
observation that "[n]othing in the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited the police from 
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed 
upon them at bhih with such enhancement 
as science and technology afforded them in 
this case." 
Everything the Supreme Court stated in 
Knotts is equally applicable to the facts of 
the present controversy. There is no material 
difference between tracking the movements 
of the Knotts defendant with a beeper and 
tracking the Jones appellant with a GPS. The 
panel opinion distinguishes Knotts-I think 
unconvincingly-not on the basis that what 
the police did in that case is any different 
than this, but that the volume of information 
obtained is greater in the present case than in 
Knotts. The panel asserts that "the" totality of 
Jones's movements over the course of a 
month ... was not exposed to the public." 
The panel reasoned that "first, unlike one's 
movements during a single journey, the 
whole of one's movements over the course 
of a month is not actually exposed to the 
public because the likelihood anyone will 
observe all these movements is effectively 
nil." I suggest that this assertion in no way 
demonstrates that Jones's movements were 
not exposed to the public. The fact that no 
particular individual se.es them all does not 
make the movements any less public. Nor is 
it evident at what point the likelihood of a 
successful continued" surveillance becomes 
so slight that the. panel would deem the 
otherwise public exposure of driving on a 
public thoroughfare to become private. As 
the Knotts COUli recalled, it is well 
established that "[w]hat a person knowingly 
exposes to the public ... is not a subject of 
FOUlih Amendment protection." In applying 
that principle in Knotts, the Supreme Court 
declared that "a person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another." 
The panel opinion seems to recognize that 
Jones had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in any particular datum revealed by 
the GPS-augmented surveillance, but 
somehow acquired one through "the totality 
of Jones's movements over the course of a 
month." In the view of the panel, this is true 
"because that whole reveals more . . . than 
does the sum of its parts." While this may be 
true, it is not evident how it affects the 
reasonable expectation of privacy bY' Jones. 
The reasonable expectation of privacy as to 
a person's movements on the highway is, as 
concluded in Knotts, zero. The sum of an 
infinite number of zero-value parts is also 
zero. Nowhere in Knotts or any other 
Supreme COUli Fourth Amendment decision 
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since the adoption of the expectation of 
privacy rationale in Katz has the Court ever 
suggested that the test of the reasonable 
expectation is. in any way related to the 
intent of the user of the data obtained by the 
surveillance or other alleged search. The 
words "reasonable expectation of· privacy" 
themselves suggest no such element. The 
expectation of privacy is on the part of the 
observed, not the observer. Granted, the 
degree of invasion of that expectation may 
be measured by the invader's intent, but an 
invasion does not occur unless there is such 
a reasonable expectation. 
Lest the importance of this opmlOn be 
underestimated, I would note that the 
invasion the panel found was not in the use 
of the GPS device, but in the aggregation of 
the information obtained. Presumably, had 
the GPS device been used for an hour or 
perhaps a day, or whatever period the panel 
believed. was consistent with a normal 
surveillance, the evidence obtained could 
have been admitted without Fourth 
Amendment problem. Therefore, it would 
appear, as appellee argues, that this novel 
aggregation approach to the reasonable 
expectation of privacy would prohibit not 
only GPS-augmented surveillance, but any 
other police surveillance of sufficient length 
to support consolidation of data into the sort 
of pattern or mosaic contemplated by the 
panel. True, the panel declares that "this 
case does not require us to, and therefore we 
do not, decide whether a hypothetical 
instance .of prolonged visual surveillance 
would be a search subject to the walTant 
requirement of the Fourth· Amendment." 
Even in the face of this declaration I cannot 
. ' discern any distinction between the 
supposed invasion by aggregation of data 
between the GPS-augmented . surveillance 
and a purely visual surveillance of 
substantial length. 
I would further note that the Seventh Circuit 
in United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 883, 128 
S.Ct. 291, 169 L.Ed.2d 140 (2007), 
concluded that "GPS tracking is on the same 
side of the divide with the surveillance 
cameras and the satellite imaging, and if 
what they do is not searching in Fourth 
Amendment terms, neither is GPS tracking." 
In light of its inconsistency with Supreme 
Court jurisprudence and with the application 
of the Fourth Amendment to similar 
circumstances by other circuits, this deci~ion 
walT ants enbanc consideration. I 
respectfully dissent from the denial. 
KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
from the denial of rehearing en banc: 
I agree with Chief Judge Sentelle that the 
panel opinion conflicts with the Supreme 
Court's decision in United States v. Knotts. I 
also share Chief Judge Sentelle's concern 
about the panel opinion's novel aggregation 
approach to Fourth Amendment analysis. 
That is not to say, however, that I think the 
Government necessarily would prevail in 
this case. The defendant contended that the 
Fourth Amendment was violated not only by 
the police surveillance without a walTant 
(the issue addressed in the panel opinion) 
but also by the police's initial installation of 
the GPS device on his car without a walTant. 
The panel opinion . did not address the 
defendant's alternative and narrower 
property-based Fourth Amendment 
. argument concerning the installation. In my 
judgment, the. defendant's alternative 
submission also poses an important question 
and deserves careful consideration by the en 
banc Court. 
The Supreme Court has stated that the 
Fourth Amendment "protects property as 
well as privacy." As the defendant here 
rightly points out, the police not only 
16 
engaged in surveillance by GPS but also 
intruded (albeit briefly and slightly) on the 
defendant's personal property, namely his 
car, to install the GPS device on the vehicle .. 
Because of the police's physical intrusion to 
install the GPS device, this case raises an 
issue that was not presented in Knotts. The 
defendant in Knotts did not own the property 
in which the beeper was· installed and thus 
did not have standing to raise any Fourth 
Amendment challenge to the installation of 
the beeper. But Justice Brennan's concurring 
opinion in Knotts foresaw the Fourth 
Amendment issue posed by the police's 
installing such a device: 
"when the Government does engage 
in physical intrusion of a 
constitutionally protected area in 
order to obtain information, that 
intrusion may constitute a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment even if the 
same information could have been 
obtained by other means." 
460 U.S. at 286, 103 S.Ct. 1081. 
As Justice Brennan noted in Knotts, the 
Supreme Court precedent that· is perhaps 
most relevant to this property-based 
ffi'gument is the ,Court's unanimous 1961 
decision in Silverman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 505, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734. In 
Silverman, the COUli concluded that 
installation of a listening device on the 
defendants' property (by accessing a heating 
duct in a shared wall of the defendants' row 
house) was subject to the FOUlih 
Amendment. The Court reasoned that the 
Fourth Amendment applied because of the 
police's physical contact with the 
defendants' property, which the' Court 
variously characterized as: "unauthorized 
physical penetration into the premises," 
"unauthorized physical encroachment within 
a constitutionally protected area," "usurping 
part of the petitioners' house or office," 
"actual intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area," and "physically 
entrench[ingJ into a man's office or home." 
The Court further determined that a physical 
encroachment on such an area triggered 
Fourth Amendment protection regardless of 
the precise details of state or local trespass 
law. . 
To be sure, since Silverman the Supreme' 
Court has held that the Fourth Amendment 
protects more than just property interests. 
But as thoroughly explained in Soldal, the 
Court has not retreated from the principle 
that the Fourth Amendment also protects 
property interests. '" [PJrotection for 
property under the Fourth Amendment' 
remains a major theme of the post-Katz era: 
If a person owns property or has a close 
relationship to the owner, access to. that 
property usually violates his reasonable 
expectation of privacy." 
If Silverman is still good law, and I see no 
indication that it is not, then Silverman may 
be relevant to the defendant's alternative 
argmnent concerning the police's 
installation of the GPS device. Cars are 
"effects" under the text of the Fourth 
Amendment, and are thus "constitutionally 
protected areas" for purposes of Silverman. 
The key Silverman-based question, 
therefore, is whether the police's installation 
of a GPS device on one's car is an 
"unauthorized physical encroachment within 
a constitutionally protected area" in the 
same way as installation of a listening 
device on a heating duct in a shared wall of 
a row house. One circuit judge has 
concluded that the Fourth Amendment does 
apply to installation of a GPS device: 
Absent the police's compliance with 
Fourth Amendment requirements, 
"people are entitled to keep police 
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officers' hands and tools off their 
vehicles. " 
United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 
113 5 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kleinfeld, J., 
concurring) . 
Without full briefing and argument, I do not 
yet know whether I agree with that 
conclusion. Whether the police's mere 
touching or manipulating of the outside of 
one's car is a"physical encroachment within 
a constitutionally protected area" requires 
fuller deliberation. In any event, it is an 
important and close question, one that the en 
banc Court should consider along with the 
separate issue raised by Chief Judge 
Sentdle. 
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"Supreme Court to Decide Whether Police Can 
Attach GPS Device to a Car Without a Warrant" 
Los Angeles Times 
June 27,2011 
David G. Savage 
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to 
decide whether police investigators seeking 
to build a criminal case may put a tracking 
device on a car without first obtaining a 
search warrant. 
The case, to be heard in the fall, figures to 
be a major test of the government's power to 
use electronic devices to secretly monitor 
individuals. 
At issue is whether tracking a motorist for 
several weeks through the use of a global 
. positioning system that has been attached to 
his car qualifies as an "unreasonable search" 
under the 4th Amendment. 
Last year, a· U.S. appeals court in 
Washington oveliurned Antoine Jones' 
drug-trafficking conviction on the grounds 
that FBI agents had used a GPS device to 
track his Jeep for a month. The judges said 
this kind of close monitoring for weeks on 
end violates a person's "reasonable 
expectation of privacy." 
In their appeal, Justice Department lawyers 
maintain that "a person traveling on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy." Since police investigators are 
free to follow a car as it moves across town, 
why is it an invasion of privacy to follow the 
vehicle with a tracking device, they asked 
The government also noted that U.S. appeals 
courts in Chicago and San Francisco had 
upheld the use of GPS devices to track crime 
suspects. 
The justices said they had voted to decide 
the case of Us. vs. Jones and rule on 
whether the suspect's 4th Amendment rights 
were violated by "installing the GPS 
tracking device on his vehicle without a 
valid warrant and without his consent." 
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"Court Asked to Balance Information Age Advances 
with Constitutional Protections" 
Washington Post 
April 24, 2011 
Robert Barnes 
It's a wide, wired world out there, more so 
every day, and the Obama administration is 
asking the Supreme Court to let law 
enforcement take advantage of it to build 
cases against the bad guys. 
The administration wants the justices to 
overturn a decision last year by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that 
said police must get a warrant before 
launching a long-term surveillance of a 
suspect using a global positioning device 
attached to the man's car. 
In overturning the conviction of a D.C. 
nightclub owner accused of being a 
prominent cocaine kingpin, Acting Solicitor 
General Neal Katyal said the appeals court 
decision was not faithful to a Supreme Court 
ruling that people have no expectation of 
privacy when traveling along public streets. 
"Prompt resolution of this conflict is 
critically important to law enforcement 
efforts throughout the United States," Katyal 
told the court in a petition asking them to 
take the case of United States v. Antoine 
Jones. 
Appeals courts in two other parts of the 
country have sided with law enforcement on 
the issue, saying police do not need a 
warrant for the kind of prolonged 
surveillance the GPS devices can provide. 
The decisions come as judges increasingly 
are asked to unravel the connection between 
modem technology . and constitutional 
protections of privacy and against 
unreasonable searches. GPS devices in cell 
phones and cars contain a wealth of 
information about a person's movements, 
and a smartphone can provide law 
enforcement with vast amounts of 
information. 
"This case is really going to confront the 
court with the problem of adopting the 
Fourth Amendment to a new information 
age," said Daniel Prywes, a Washington 
lawyer who wrote a brief in the Jones case 
for the American Civil Liberties Union and 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation. 
"I think it's the seminal privacy case of the 
21 st century." 
Jones had been sentenced to life in prison 
and ordered to surrender $1 million in drug 
profits before the appeals court overturned 
his conviction last year. For a month, police 
had recorded his trips around the 
Washington area-from his home to Levels, 
his nightclub in Northeast D.C.-and 
repeated trips to a stash house in Prince 
George's County, where police eventually 
found mounds of cocaine and $850,000 in 
cash .. 
The government contends that the court has 
already answered the question of whether 
the surveillance of Jones was proper. 
In 1983, the court ruled in United States v. 
Knotts that police were within their power to 
track a beeper device they had placed ih a 
can of chemicals used for drug production. 
"A person traveling in an automobile on 
public . thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements 
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from one place to another," it said. 
But an ideologically diverse panel of the 
D.C. circuit was unanimous in saying that 
. the justices in Knotts specifically did not 
decide the issue of whether a more intrusive 
governmenf action, such as "twenty-four 
hour surveillance," would require a warrant. 
Circuit Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg wrote 
that the 28-day tracking of Jones's every 
movement in his Jeep was too much. 
Although the travel evidence submitted to 
the jury was all on public streets, he said 
"the whole of a person's movements over 
the course of a month is not actually 
exposed to the public because the likelihood 
a stranger would observe all those 
movements ... is essentially nil." 
While no single trip can prove a pattern of a 
person's life, Ginsburg wrote: 
"A person who knows all of another's 
travels can deduce whether he is a weekly 
churchgoer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the 
gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient 
receiving medical treatment, an associate of 
particUlar individuals or political groups." 
When the full circuit declined to review the 
panel's decision, Chief Judge David Sentelle 
provided the opposing arguments for three 
other dissenters .. 
A person's reasonable expectation of 
privacy while traveling on public highways 
is zero, he said, and "the sum of an infinite 
number of zero-value parts is also zero." 
He said the panel's decision calls· into 
question "any other police surveillance of 
sufficient length" to establish a pattern. 
Katya1 told the court that GPS tracking is a 
vital tool for government in establishing the 
kind of probable cause necessary to get a 
warrant. Stifling its use at the early stages of 
. an investigation, he said, "will seriously 
impede the government's ability to 
investigate leads and tips on drug 
trafficking, terrorism and other crimes." ... 
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"Appeals Court Limits Use of GPS 
to Track Suspects" 
Washington Post 
August 7,2010 
Spencer S. Hsu 
A federal appeals court ruled for the first 
time Friday that police cannot use a Global 
Positioning System device to track a 
person's movements for an extended time 
without a warrant, clearing the way for the 
Supreme Court to decide the privacy impact 
of the new surveillance technology ih 
products such as cellphones and vehicle-
navigation systems. 
. The decision, by a three-judge panel of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 
created a split with federal circuit cOUlis in 
New York and California that have upheld 
warrantless GPS -tracking of a vehicle by 
law enforcement. Feeding the national 
debate, a half-dozen state courts have issued 
conflicting rulings, while police across the 
country embrace GPS tools in hunting drug 
dealers, sexual . predators and violent 
criminals. 
In striking down the drug conviction of 
Antoine Jones, former co-owner of a District 
nightclub called Levels, the D.C. cOUli said 
the FBI and District police overstepped their 
authority by tracking his movements round-
the-clock for four weeks, placing a GPS 
monitoring device on his Jeep after an initial 
warrant had expired. 
U.S. Circuit Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg, 
writing for a unanimous and ideologically 
diverse panel that included judges David S. 
Tatel and Thomas B. Griffith, said such . 
surveillance technology represents a leap 
forward in potential government intrusion 
that violates constitutional protections 
against unreasonable searches. 
"A single trip to a gynecologist's office tells 
little about a woman, but that trip followed a 
few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply 
store tells a different story," Ginsburg wrote. 
He added, "A person who knows all of 
another's travels can deduce whether he is a 
weekly churchgoer, a heavy drinker, a 
regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an 
outpatient receiving medical treatment, an 
associate - of patiicular individuals or 
political groups-and not just one such fact 
about a person, but all such facts." 
Bill Miller, spokesman for U.S. Attorney 
Ronald C. Machen Jr. of the District said, 
"We're studying the opinion and have no 
further comment." 
Jones's attorney, Stephen Leckar, along with 
the American Civil Liberties Union of D.C. 
and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
which filed friend of the court briefs, called 
the case an important constitutional 
precedent ready for Supreme Court review. 
"This case is really a big step toward 
bringing the Fourth Amendment into the 
21st century," said Arthur Spitzer of the 
D.C. ACLU. "The technology of the 21st 
century needs to be judged on its own terms, 
and not in terms of what some early 20th-
century technologies meant." 
Kevin Bankston, senior staff attorney for the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, said the case 
has important implications for cellphone 
GPS tracking. The federal government has 
mandated that U.S. cellphone carriers make 
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nearly all their phones trackable for help in 
911 emergencies. However, companies say 
that the federal law that allows them to tum 
over data to law enforcement without 
subpoenas is prone to abuse. 
Although federal magistrate judges typically 
require walTants for GPS-enabled cellphone 
tracking, the issue is before a federal circuit 
court for the first time in Philadelphia, 
Bankston said. 
In the Jones vehicle-tracking case, civil 
libeliarians say police should have obtained 
a judge's approval for a WalTant based on 
probable cause that he was committing a 
crime. Police argue that officers can freely 
trail a person on public thoroughfares, and 
using technology to do the same thing saves 
taxpayer money and police resources. 
The Supreme Court in 1983 held that the use 
without a walTant of a "beeper"-like 
transponder to track five gallons of 
chemicals carried by a suspect in his car 
from Minneapolis to a drug lab at a lakeside 
cabin in Wisconsin was permissible. The 
car's driver had no expectation of privacy 
because he drove on public . roads and 
"voluntarily conveyed to anyone who 
wanted to look" where he was going. 
However, the Court also noted that evidence 
about the suspect's car monitored only a 
single one-way trip, and withheld judgment. 
about whether a warrant would be needed 
for "dragnet-type" or "twenty-four hour 
surveillance" by law enforcement. In 
Friday's opinion, the D.C. appellate judges 
focused on the unprecedented reach of new 
technology, making surveillance possible 
continuously and cheaply. 
"Practical considerations prevent visual 
surveillance from lasting very long. 
Continuous human surveillance for a week 
would require all the time and expense of 
. several police officers," Ginsburg wrote. 
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"Supreme Court Agrees to Review Case on GPS and 
the Fourth Amendment" 
The Volokh Conspiracy 
June 27, 2011 
Orin Kerr 
According to this morning's order list, the 
Supreme Court has agreed to review United 
States v. Jones, the DC Circuit's "mosaic 
theory" case on whether and when use of a 
GPS device installed on a car is a Fourth 
Amendment search. The Court added a 
question, as well: 
"Whether . the government violated 
. respondent's Fourth Amendment rights by 
installing the GPS tracking device on his 
vehicle without a valid warrant and without 
his consent." 
I'm glad the Court granted in this case, and 
I'm also also glad they added the question 
on installing the device. The installation 
question was the piece of the puzzle that was 
strangely left out of the Knotts case thirty 
years ago, and as' I· blogged back when 
Judge Kavanaugh flagged the issue in his 
dissent from denial of rehearing, I think its a 
difficult and important question. (Lower 
courts have uniformly held that installing the 
device is not a search or seizure, but I've 
never found their reasoning very 
persuasive.) 
The fact that the Court added the question 
about installing the device adds a really 
interesting wrinkle to the Jones. case. Let's 
. simplify .a tad and assume that the only issue 
is whether the installation and/or use of the 
GPS is a search or seizure-that is, let's 
assume that if there is a search or seizure, 
then it's unreasonable because there was no 
valid warrant. If that's the case, then the 
government needs five votes agreeing with it 
on three different issues: (1) Installation of 
the GPS is not a search or seizure; (2) Initial 
use is not a search or seizure, cmd (3)I,ong-
telID use is not a search or seizure. 
Only question (3) implicates the rationale of 
the DC Circuit's opinion, what I have called 
the "mosaic theory," and it's always been 
quite unlikely that the Supreme Court would 
adopt that theory: It's such a radical 
departure from anything that has come 
before in Fourth Amendment law that it's . 
pretty hard to imagine it getting five votes. 
What makes the added question in Jones 
intriguing is that argument (1) is probably 
the argument most likely (if any) to swing 
conservative Justices to the defense side. On 
argument (2), KnottslKaro. has already 
created an established line that has worked 
for 30 years; I don't know if the 
conservative Justices will be inclined to 
mess with it. But the installing of the device 
may give a Justice Scalia or Thomas second 
thoughts; the act of installing the device is 
the act of interfering with someone's private 
property, and it likely would be a taking 
under Fifth Amendment principles. Given 
the historical connection between the Fourth· 
Amendment and trespass law, it's 
conceivable that an originalist Justice might 
conclude that the interference with a 
person's private property without a warrant 
triggered by installing the device violates the 
Fourth Amendment even if the subsequent 
use does not. 
With the current Court, the better bet in any 
Fourth Amendment case is that the 
Government . will win. But the added 
question makes this a particularly 
fascinating case to watch. 
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"The Court Agrees to Hear a.Case About 
Warrantless GPS Tracking on Cars" 
Slate 
June 27, 2011 
Walter Dellinger 
While you all are dissecting today's 
opinions, I've been looking at the "orders 
list." The court announced today that next 
term it would hear and decide United States 
v. Jones, a case asking whether the 
wanantless tracking of vehicles by GPS 
devices violates the Fourth Amendment. (I 
should note that I'm working on the case 
with my former student Stephen Leckar of 
Shainis & Peltzman, who is counsel of 
record for Antoine Jones.) 
Federal law enforcement officials installed a 
"global positioning system" device to track 
every movement Jones, his wife, and his son 
made in their vehicle for 24 hours of every 
day for four weeks. The Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia determined that 
this intensive monitoring of Jones' 
movements for an extended period of time 
invaded his reasonable expectation of 
privacy and thus constituted a search under 
the Fourth Amendment. Because the 
government had no valid wanant (and made 
no showing that the search was reasonable 
without a wanant) the Court of Appeals 
reversed Jones' conviction on drug charges. 
In its petition asking the Supreme COUli to 
review the case, the solicitor general stated 
that federal law enforcement agencies 
"frequently use" GPS tracking devices to 
follow "leads and tips before suspicions 
have ripened into probable cause." A 
requirement that a warrant be obtained from 
a magistrate before tracking an individual, 
the government argued, "will seriously 
impede criminal investigations" in "many 
scenarios." 
The solicitor general's petition focused on 
the holding of the court below that the 
tracking violated the Fourth Amendment. 
While we opposed any review of the 
decision below, we also suggested to the 
court that if it granted the government's 
petition, it should also address an additional 
question: whether the installation of the 
GPS device on Jones' car was itself a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. As 
Judge Kavanaugh said in a concurring 
opinion in the Court of Appeals, this 
"property-based Fourth Amendment 
argument" raises "an important and close 
question." The Supreme Court granted this 
second question as well, so next term it will 
be deciding the conceptually separate 
questions of: 1) whether a wanant is 
required for the actual secret installation of a 
GPS device on a person's automobile; and 
2) whether a wanant is required for the 
extended GPS tracking of a person's 
movements in a vehicle. 
The grant of review in this case sets the 
stage for an extraordinary encounter 
between the constitutional right against 
unreasonable searches adopted at the end of 
the 18th century and the amazing techriology 
of the 21 st century. The "Navigational 
Satellite Timing and Ranging Global 
Positioning System" was developed in 1978 
by the Department of Defense for military 
use. In 2000, the government decided to 
make accurate transmissions aval1able for 
civilian use. And this led, inexorably, to the· 
widespread use of GPS devices in 
investigations. As my co-counsel Steve 
Leckar noted in a statement today, "there is 
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nothing inherently wrong with deploying 
these devices to assist law enforcement. On 
the other hand, no one can dispute that they 
are extraordinarily intrusive." The issue is 
not whether GPS devices can be used by law 
enforcement, but . whether there should 
generally be the age-old check of an 
independent magistrate deciding whether the 
search is justified before such a space-age 
intrusion takes place .... 
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Like many Americans, police forces are 
quick to . adopt new electronic devices, 
capable of processing a wide range of 
information despite the small size of many 
such instruments-some as small as a pack 
of gum. The Supreme Court is more 
cautious in the face of advances in 
technology, preferring to move slowly in 
settling the new constitutional issues stirred 
up. Next to testits approach, it appears, will 
be police use of GPS tracking. One appeal 
on the issue is already at the Court; another, 
from the federal government, may not be far 
behind. 
GPS-or Global Positioning System-is a 
way of using orbiting satellites to locate, 
with accuracy to 100 feet or less,an object 
or a place. In a car, a GPS device can tell 
directions, and guide a motorist to the next 
interchange, or the next fast-food restaurant. 
It works by recording precise geographic 
locations; one after the other. The device's 
memory can show an entire trip. Obviously, 
then, it is a good device for monitoring 
someone's movements. And that is how 
police departments are now using it-an 
alternative to hidden cameras or visual 
surveillance. 
What the Court is now being asked to decide 
is, first, whether a GPS track is a "search," 
under the Constitution's Fourth 
Amendment, and when might the continuous 
monitoring of a track become an invalid 
search if police do it without having a search 
warrant. The Supreme Court left that second 
question open wh~m, in Us. v. Knotts in 
1983, it ruled that police use of an electronic 
beeper to track a suspect's trip to a drug lab 
was not a search. What seems to be newly at 
issue is the role that the duration of tracking 
plays in the constitutional equation; the 
argument is that, the longer the tracking, the 
more movements are monitored, the greater 
the potential for invading privacy. 
The issue may lead the Court into a 
discussion of just when a car or truck 
moving about in public places becomes not 
an object of public viewing but a conveyor 
of private information. The Court has often 
allowed more police activity toward moving 
vehicles than stationary, private places; the 
"automobile exception" to the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement goes 
back to Carroll v. Us., a 1925 decision. 
Earlier this month, lawyers for an Oregon 
man, Juan Pineda-Moreno, filed the first 
GPS tracking case at the Court (Pineda-
Moreno v. Us., docket 10-7515) .... The 
Ninth Circuit Court ruled that such a track 
was not a search[.]. .. A Circuit Court order 
den[ied] en bane review, together with a 
vigorous dissent[.]. .. There is a better-than-
even chance that the Court will hear .the 
case-or perhaps the next case to come 
along-because there . is widespread 
disagreement among the lower federal and 
state courts on the issue. 
The next case that seems likely to follow 
Pineda-Moreno to the Court could be one by 
the federal government. It lost a case 
involving a District of Columbia drug dealer 
in the D.C. Circuit Court, conflicting 
directly with the Ninth Circuit. ... Just last 
Friday, the D.C. Circuit Court denied the 
Justice Depatiment's plea for en bane 
review by a 5-4 vote on the GPS issue[.] ... 
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The government may tip its hand on its next 
step when it responds to the Pineda-Moreno 
petition; that response, unless the time is 
extended, is now due on Dec. 17. Among 
the government's other options would be to 
agree that the Court should hear the Oregon 
case, or urge the 'Justices to hold it while the 
government pursues its own appeal in the 
Maynard case (Lawrence Maynard's 
companion case did not raise the GPS issue; 
that was an issue for Antoine Jones in a 
consolidated case. The government sought 
rehearing only as to Jones and the GPS 
question.) 
The Oregon case began in the early summer 
of 2007, when federal narcotics agents went 
into the driveway of Juan Pineda~Moreno's 
mobile home, and put a GPS tracking device 
under the bumper of his Jeep Grand 
Cherokee. Between June and September, 
they made seven trips to the Cherokee, 
sometimes ih the driveway, sometimes at the 
curb, once at his workplace, installing GPS . 
devices, some as small as a pack of chewing 
gum, or. replacing the batteries. Pineda-
Moreno was completely unaware. 
Ultimately, the four months of GPS tracking 
turned up an alTay of information about 
Pineda-Moreno's movements-where he 
went, how long he stayed, the stops he 
made. Most critically, they tracked the 
vehicle to remote forest areas in southern 
Oregon and northern California, leading to 
the discovery of large plots of cultivated 
marIJuana.· 
Pineda-Moreno pleaded guilty to one count 
of growing marijuana-more than 1,000 
plants-and one count of a conspiracy to do 
so. His guilty plea was on condition that he 
could appeal to challenge the evidence 
.gathered with the GPS tracking. He was 
sentenced to four years and three months in 
prison. The Ninth· Circuit, agreeing with the 
trial court, found the GPS monitoring was 
not a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
In seeking Supreme Court review, his 
lawyers raised two questions: first, whether 
the prolonged monitoring via the GPS 
devices was a search (the issue on which the 
Ninth Circuit and D.C. Circuit explicitly 
disagree), and, second, whether the secret 
planting of the device on the Jeep while on 
private property (the "curtilage" of his 
mobile home) was an invalid search. 
The petition, like the panel on the D.C. 
Circuit in the case there, relied significantly 
upon a passing comment that the Supreme 
Court made as it decided the Knotts case 27 
years ago. If surveillance round-the-clock of 
"any citizen of this country" should occur 
"without judicial knowledge or 
supervision," the Court said, "there will be . 
time enough thento determine" whether that 
was unconstitutional. That, according to 
Pineda-Moreno's counsel, is his case. 
The case, the petition asserted, "addresses 
precisely the type of 'dragnet' monitoring of 
personal information that this Court 
expressly noted ... would warrant further 
review." There is growing conflict and 
inconsistency among both federal and state 
courts on the Fourth Amendment and GPS 
tracking, the filing argued. 
Among other points discussing the Knotts 
precedent, the petition suggested that· the 
GPS device gave police' considerably more 
opportunity to track private moverrients than 
the beeper involved in that case. A beeper 
operates on a radio frequency,so police 
have to be within range of it to pick up the 
signal, the petition noted, while GPS devices 
"record all information as to the subject's 
whereabouts and do not require police 
tracking." 
The D.C. Circuit relied upon that difference, 
as well as on the prolonged nature of GPS 
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monitoring, in declaring that the Antoine 
Jones case was not controlled by what the 
Supreme Court had held in the Knotts 
decision. Other courts have felt directly 
bound in GPS cases by Knotts, and the 
Justice Department made that point when it 
asked the D.C. Circuit to rehear en bane the 
Jones case. 
Federal prosecutors' rehearing petition in 
the Jones case could be read as telegraphing 
what a government appeal to the Supreme 
Court in that case would argue. The D.C. 
Circuit panel's decision on GPS tracking, 
that ,document argued, "calls into question 
the use many common and accepted forms 
of surveillance of public places, such as 
visual surveillance and fixed cameras .... If 
the panel's opinion remains in force, well-
accepted investigative techniques such as 
physical and photographic surveillance of 
persons, places, and objects exposed to 
public view could be called into question if 
the use of those techniques were sufficiently . 
'sustained' or 'prolonged. '" 
The attorneys for Antoine Jones opposed 
further review in the D.C. Circuit, 
suggesting that the government was raising a 
"sky is falling" claim, and arguing that the 
panel had simply required agents "to get a 
warrant before engaging in prolonged use of 
GPS in a criminal investigation." 
The debate over the scope and impact of that 
ruling was taken up anew by dueling 
opinions among the judges when en bane 
review was denied. 
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